Dialogues concerning Natural Politics: Book Ten
The anti-ontological argument against unrealizable utopia
Book Ten Synopsis: The Dialogues conclude with a brief political epistemological analysis of a real-world case. A taxonomy of the varieties of policymaker ignorance is described. A novel political epistemological argument against John Rawls’ political philosophy is offered. A novel argument against utopian theorizing in political analysis is also presented.
Dramatis Personae
Emma – 30 years old; Fifth-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in political philosophy and epistemology; ABD (“all-but-dissertation”); dating Andre
Andre – 35 years old; Fourth-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in philosophy of science; Academic Advisor to undergraduate students in the Philosophy Department; dating Emma
Connor – 24 years old; Second-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in normative ethics; a devout political progressive
Jack – 25 years old; Second-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in logic and epistemology; a devout political libertarian
Book Ten
[Thanksgiving 2009. The graduate students are gathered to celebrate the holiday. The University Administration has finalized its plans for the University’s re-organization, which will involve the integration of the erstwhile Philosophy and History Departments into a new administrative entity called…]
Andre: “The School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry and Thought.”
Emma: Wait – SHPIT?
Andre: Yep, SHPIT.
Connor: Morons!
Jack: Twice one letter from disaster.
Connor: What is “Inquiry” if not “Thought”?
Emma: It’s so nice, they named it twice.
Jack: They really like conjunctions, don’t they?
Emma: Yes…and uh-huh.
Andre: What’s worse than the name – which is awful, obviously – is the asinine explanation they’re offering for merging or, to use their term, “integrating,” the history and philosophy departments. They seem to expect historians and philosophers to work together, to co-author together, but, unless it’s the occasional history-of-philosophy paper, I don’t understand why the Administration would think such “synergies” – their term – between history and philosophy are likely to emerge. Just more colleagues to not talk to. History and philosophy are both humanities disciplines, and they might occasionally refer to each other, but there’s no reason to think that merging the departments will improve research productivity, which I assume is part of what’s meant by “synergy.”
Emma: Synergy is a business-school concept…and we know the value of business-school education…
Andre: Yes, we do. When I worked in business, the dumbest people and worst businesspeople were invariably the MBAs. If there was a stupid and wasteful idea to promote, it was inevitably an MBA doing the promoting.
Connor: From what I understand, talking to other people around campus, the Administration basically combined as many former departments into coherent or, as the case may be, semi-coherent, wholes as possible. Political science and all of the other policy-related departments have been combined into one entity. Architecture, design, and all of the other former departments that do design-y kinds of things have been merged into a new School of Design. It seems like they just ran out of other departments with which to merge History and Philosophy.
Andre: Right. The truth is that we are The School of Misfit Humanities Disciplines. This synergy shpit is just a smokescreen to make it seem like they have some idea what they’re doing.
Emma: Did you say “shpit”?
Andre [smiles]: See my shpit-eating grin?
Jack: That’s a shpitty thing to say.
Connor: Yeah, that’s not likely to catch on.
Jack: Eat shpit, you shpithead!
Connor: Don’t make me beat the shpit out of you…
Emma: What do you want to bet the name has been changed by the time we get to campus on Monday?
Connor: I wouldn’t take that bet…
Andre: We’re dealing with ignoramuses scrambling to conceal their ignorance.
Emma: Well, be a bit careful. That is one possible implication of the analysis we are all now committed to, but there are other possibilities.
Jack: Wait, what?! After all your talk, you’re now denying that our esteemed President and his administrative cronies are ignorant?
Emma: No, no, no, I would never deny that. What I’m saying is that we have not done the analysis necessary to determine whether and to what extent they’re ignorant, what their ignorance consists of, and how it influences their decisions. There are four possibilities. They might be knowledgeable of their ignorance how to satisfy the University’s educational mission or they might be ignorant of their knowledge with respect to this goal. In either case, since they believe that earnest attempts to satisfy the University’s mission are likely to end in failure, they face an incentive to do something other than earnestly attempt to realize this goal; it is fair to say in either case that their efforts, such as they are, are in fact aimed at the less epistemically challenging goal of merely pretending to satisfy the University’s educational mission or, in Andre’s terms, that they’re “scrambling to conceal their ignorance.” However, alternatively, it could be that administrators are ignorant of their ignorance with respect to some of the knowledge required to deliberately satisfy the University’s mission; in other words, that the President and Deans mistakenly believe that they possess all of the knowledge required. We could not say, in this case, that the Administration was trying to conceal their ignorance, because they don’t believe they’re ignorant. It would be closer to the truth to say that they are flaunting their ignorance…of their ignorance [laughs].
Connor: How can we distinguish those cases in practice? How can we tell when policymakers are knowledgeable of their ignorance, rather than ignorant of their knowledge or ignorant of their ignorance?
Andre: I think we would actually have to do the kind of analysis that Emma has suggested. We would have to consider the first-order knowledge required to satisfy the University’s educational mission and then examine the knowledge available to the Administration. If we determined that they lacked some of the required first-order knowledge, we could at least conclude that they were not ignorant of their knowledge, since they are in fact not first-order knowledgeable. However, it would still be difficult to determine empirically whether they were second-order knowledgeable of their first-order ignorance or second-order ignorant of their ignorance. We would need evidence whether or not the Administration agreed with the analyst’s dim view of their epistemic position, but the observable evidence would be the same whether they earnestly pursued or merely pretended to pursue the goal of satisfying the University’s educational mission: they would appear to be trying, but would ultimately fail, to satisfy it. So…yeah. I guess I can’t say conclusively that they are scrambling to conceal their ignorance. They might actually believe they are not ignorant.
Emma: What do we believe?
Andre: They’re dumb as rocks. And if they don‘t recognize that they’re dumb as rocks, then they’re dumb as…I don’t know, especially dumb rocks. They’re dumber than the average rocks.
Emma: Well put, Andre. Very articulate [laughs].
Connor: That’s pretty dumb.
Jack: What’s the fourth possibility, Emma?
Emma: Huh?
Jack: You said there were four possibilities for policymaker ignorance…
Emma: Oh right. The fourth possibility is that they’re not ignorant and they know they’re not ignorant – that they are knowledgeable about their knowledge – with respect to the goal. It is only these policymakers whose incentives cannot be distorted by ignorance. Following Plato, we might call them the “true pilots of the ship of state,” who possess the knowledge required to guide the ship through any and all tempests and storms, not to mention, mutinies.
Andre: I think we have a similar problem here, as before, in empirically distinguishing cases of ignorance of knowledge and cases of knowledge of knowledge, right? If they are ignorant of their knowledge, they will appear to pursue the goal, and, if they are knowledgeable of their knowledge, they will also appear to pursue the goal, but only this latter pursuit will be earnest, the former will be playacting.
Emma: There is a relevant difference though: if they know that they know, then the goal will be realized, full stop; if they are ignorant of their knowledge, they will merely playact at pursuing the goal and it will not be realized, unless spontaneous forces intervene. Thus, if the goal is not realized, we can say, albeit only ex post, that policymakers were definitely ignorant of their knowledge and merely playacted at pursuing the goal. If the goal is realized, then we can infer whether or not policymakers were knowledgeable about their knowledge, if we can get some grasp on whether spontaneous forces were involved in the realization of the goal. If it seems that spontaneous forces were involved, we can infer that policymakers were ignorant of their knowledge, merely playacting, and that the goal was spontaneously realized, despite their ignorance. If there is no evidence that spontaneous forces were involved, we can say that policymakers were knowledgeable about their knowledge, and the goal was deliberately realized, because of their knowledge.
Andre: I think what we’re running up against here are the observable limits of the sort of analysis Emma recommends. We can get some empirical grasp on policymakers’ first-order knowledge and ignorance by referring to the deficiencies of publicly-available knowledge relative to the epistemic requirements of some potential policy goal. And this is surely useful for all the reasons Emma has mentioned. However, a person’s second-order knowledge and ignorance is no more directly observable than their motivations, so were left with only the possibility of indirectly inferring their second-order knowledge and, thus, their motivations from the results of their decisions plus what we can learn about their first-order knowledge.
Emma: All true. But the really crucial point is that, up until now, political inquiry has treated all policymakers as true pilots of the ship of state, at least implicitly, inasmuch as it has failed to account for the distorting effects of ignorance on policymakers’ incentives, motivations, reasons for acting, etc., and, perhaps more to the point, to the extent it has ignored the consequences of these effects for how we should conceive of ideal government. In other words, we can infer from the fact that the motivation- and incentive-distorting effects of policymaker ignorance have heretofore been ignored that policymakers have implicitly been treated throughout the history of political thought as true pilots of the ship of state. Once you grasp the significance of policymakers’ ignorance and the way it distorts policymakers’ incentives, you immediately understand the utter inanity of much political philosophy. I mean, see John Rawls.
Connor: Hey, hey, hey. Don’t speak ill of Rawls. Rawls was awesome.
Emma: Rawls was awesome at pointless utopian wankery. He was awesome at speculating about a world very different from our own, the significance of which may be zero for the world we actually occupy.
Connor: Why do you say that?
Andre: Ah, Emma. Just wantonly slinging crap at the twentieth century’s greatest political philosopher……God, I love you.
Emma [smiles]: Connie, haven’t we covered this ground already?
Connor: I’m sorry. I haven’t taken the time to think much about the meaning of your approach to politics for specific political philosophies. Either that or I’m just dense. Take your pick.
Emma: Both. Both lazy and dense. But, it’s alright. You’ll learn.
Connor: Your confidence is inspiring…
Emma: Connie, like other political thinkers, Rawls wanted to make good government consist of a particular conception of justice, or of political “oughts,” without first considering how epistemic considerations constrain the relevant possibilities. He conjured an allegedly ideal notion of justice without any consideration of the extent to which this ideal could be realized in the real world, whether or not with the assistance of spontaneous forces. The only people who are notbehind the veil of ignorance in Rawls’ system are, apparently, the policymakers charged with realizing a political system that embodies Rawls’ ideal principles of justice as fairness. But, this assumption that policymakers’ knowledge is adequate to the epistemic requirements of a political system based on the principles of justice as fairness is at the very least doubtable, if not manifestly false, always and everywhere.
Connor: But, this has no bearing on justice as fairness as an ideal. Surely, justice as fairness might be unrealizable, yet nevertheless be the relevant goal at which liberal politics should aim.
Emma: Maybe. Frankly, I’ve never understood the argument that we should aim at impossible ideals. If it were the case that aiming for impossible ideals necessarily brought us closer to such ideals, if aiming for impossible ideals necessarily meant improvement of our circumstances, but this is not the case. Aiming for impossible ideals in the absence of adequate knowledge or evidence of the adequacy of relevant spontaneous forces may well lead to deterioration of our circumstances, if not disaster.
Connor: Yeah, OK.
Emma: In any case, I would think that the extent to which Rawls’ proposed ideal is realizable in practice has some bearing on its status qua ideal. Recall how Rawls arrives at the principles of justice as fairness. He asks what principles of justice people would choose behind a veil of ignorance with regard to their respective statuses in society, their race, gender, income and wealth, their moral conceptions of the good, et cetera. Is it not at least conceivable that the principles of justice these people would choose would depend to some degree on their judgments concerning the realizability of systems associated with different sets of principles? In other words, if they knew that policymakers were too ignorant and spontaneous forces too weak to realize political systems in line with the principles of justice as fairness, might they choose different – more realizable – principles? The allegedly ideal nature of Rawls’ principles depends on a combination of unspoken and dubious premises. In order for people in the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, to settle upon the principles of justice as fairness, they must either not care about, or either believe policymaker knowledge or spontaneous forces adequate to,
the realization of the political systems the founding principles they are asked to decide.
Connor: Ah, OK. I see what you’re saying. You’re not questioning the value of utopian theorizing, of thinking about the kind of political world we would consider to be ideal, were realizability irrelevant, you’re just arguing that, in Rawls’ case, because of the way he sets up his argument, realizability – or, more exactly, non-realizability – is relevant to the question of the principles of justice that would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.
Emma: No. No, no, no. I am very much arguing for the stronger claim. Generally speaking, an unrealizable “ideal” is no ideal at all. The concept of an unrealizable political utopia is internally incoherent, because any ideal or utopian system worthy of the adjective is necessarily realizable. Call it the anti-ontological argument against unrealizable utopia.
Jack: [smiles]: Oh, god.
Andre [sighs]: I know where this is going. I’m going to check on the turkey.
Connor [laughs]: The “anti-ontological argument”? Care to elaborate?
Emma: Simple. Imagine two otherwise identical, purportedly “ideal,” political utopia. The only difference between the two utopia is that one is realizable and the other is not.
Connor: How can they be “otherwise identical,” but one realizable and the other not? What could make the difference to their distinct realizabilities but some difference in the respective utopia, making them not “otherwise identical”?
Emma: Good question, but the relevant difference need not be within the political programs. The difference could be that one utopia is proposed in adequate political-epistemological circumstances and the other in deficient political-epistemological conditions. One utopia might be proposed in circumstances in which policymakers possess knowledge or spontaneous forces are adequate to its realization, and the other – otherwise identical – utopia might be meant for circumstances in which policymakers do not possess knowledge, and spontaneous forces are not, adequate to its realization.
Connor: Right, gotcha.
Emma: So, the obvious question is, which of these two utopias is actually ideal? The one that cannot be realized or the one that can?
Connor: Clearly, the one that can be realized.
Emma: So, unrealizable utopia are not in fact ideal?
Connor: It follows…
Emma: And what determines the realizability of a political system?
Connor: The knowledge and ignorance of the policymakers charged with realizing it…
Emma: …And?
Connor: And the adequacy of any available spontaneous forces that might compensate for relevant policymaker ignorance.
Emma: Boys…there’s hope for you both yet.
Andre: [shouts from kitchen]: Turkey’s ready!
Emma [to Jack and Connor]: Shall we?
[THE END]
Book Ten: For Further Reading
On the Analysis of Policymaker Ignorance in Real-World Settings
Ludwig von Mises – “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” in F. A. Hayek (ed.), Collectivist Economic Planning, F. A. Hayek (ed.) ([1920] 1935), Routledge
F. A. Hayek – “The Pretence of Knowledge,” in The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume XV, The Market and Other Orders ([1975] 2014), Bruce J. Caldwell (ed.), 362–372, University of Chicago Press
Scott Scheall – F. A. Hayek and the Epistemology of Politics: The Curious Task of Economics (2020), Routledge
Scott Scheall and Parker Crutchfield – “A Case Study in the Problem of Policymaker Ignorance: Political Responses to COVID-19” (2021), Cosmos + Taxis: Studies in Emergent Order and Organization, 9 (5-6), 18-28
On John Rawls and the Original Position
John Rawls – A Theory of Justice ([1971] 1999), Harvard University Press
Robert Nozick – Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Basic Books
Ronald Dworkin – Taking Rights Seriously (1977), Harvard University Press
John Rawls – Political Liberalism, Second Edition ([1993] 2005), Columbia University Press
John Rawls – Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), Harvard University Press
Timothy Hinton (ed.) – The Original Position (2016), Cambridge University Press
Gerald Gaus – The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society (2016), Princeton University Press
David Schmidtz – “Ideal Theory,” in The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice, Serena Olsaretti (ed.) (2018), Oxford University Press
Samuel Freeman – “Original Position” (2019), in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/
On Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God
Anselm, St. – Proslogion, With the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Thomas Williams (trans.) ([1078] 2001), Hackett
Gaunilo – “On Behalf of the Fool,” in Proslogion, With the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Thomas Williams (trans.) ([1078] 2001), Hackett
Rene Descartes – Meditations on First Philosophy ([1641] 1999), Hackett
Gottfried Leibniz – New Essay Concerning Human Understanding ([1709] 1896), Macmillan
Immanuel Kant – Critique of Pure Reason, Werner S. Pluhar (trans.) ([1781, 1787] 1996), Hackett
Graham Oppy – “Ontological Arguments” (2019), in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/
Book Ten: Discussion Questions
1. Consider and discuss the implications of each of the combinations of first- and second-order policymaker knowledge / ignorance with respect to some policy goal for the questions (a) whether, under their given epistemic circumstances, policymakers are likely to pursue the goal or some other course of action (including merely pretending to pursue the goal) and (b) whether, if policymakers pursue the goal given their epistemic circumstances, it is likely to be realized without the assistance of spontaneous forces?
2. Why is it difficult to empirically distinguish cases of knowledge of ignorance from cases of ignorance of ignorance?
3. What distinguishes cases of ignorance of knowledge from cases of knowledge of knowledge?
4. In what sense have the various fields of political inquiry (political science, political philosophy / theory, political economy, economics) traditionally treated policymakers as “true pilots of the ship of state”?
5. How is the nature and extent of policymakers’ relevant knowledge / ignorance significant for the conception of justice that persons would choose in John Rawls’ original position, behind the “veil of ignorance”?