Dialogues concerning Natural Politics: Book Nine
Explaining the causes and effects of policy decisions
Book Nine Synopsis: The discussion of how to fruitfully analyze the nature and extent of policymaker ignorance, and the complementary need for spontaneity, continues in Book Nine. Conceiving of policymakers as ignorant serves to explain not only the effects, but also the causes, of their policy decisions. The extent to which policymakers are self-interested or constituent-minded is determined by the nature and extent of their knowledge, and ignorance, concerning self-interested and constituent-minded policy objectives. If we can get some grasp on the nature and extent of policymaker ignorance, we can also get some grasp on whether their decisions will be self-interested or constituent-minded; we will also find ourselves, moreover, in a better position to predict whether relevant policy objectives will be realized and to explain the success, or failure, of related policies. The limitations of political epistemological inquiry are also addressed.
Dramatis Personae
Emma – 30 years old; Fifth-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in political philosophy and epistemology; ABD (“all-but-dissertation”); dating Andre
Andre – 35 years old; Fourth-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in philosophy of science; Academic Advisor to undergraduate students in the Philosophy Department; dating Emma
Connor – 24 years old; Second-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in normative ethics; a devout political progressive
Jack – 25 years old; Second-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in logic and epistemology; a devout political libertarian
Book Nine
Connor: But, what about the next part of the analysis? Given an analysis of the knowledge required to deliberately realize some policy objective and an analysis of the knowledge actually possessed by policymakers, what is involved in analyzing whether any spontaneous forces are in operation that might compensate for the ignorance of policymakers?
Emma: In this stage of the analysis, the analyst asks, in effect, “Given the nature and extent of policymaker ignorance relative to the epistemic requirements of the policy objective, how must spontaneous forces compensate, if this ignorance is to be overcome and the relevant goal realized?” The initial – and surely unsatisfying – answer to this question will always be that spontaneous forces must compensate to mitigate the consequences of the specific kind and extent of policymaker ignorance. That is, if policymakers’ theoretical knowledge is inadequate to a degree, then spontaneous forces will have to compensate for this deficiency to the required degree.
Andre: I would think that what this means, as a practical matter, is that the analyst asks, “What kind of spontaneous forces might compensate for this lack of theoretical knowledge and is there evidence that these forces operate in the relevant domain?” So, to return to the diabetes example, if an adequate etiological theory of diabetes is not available, the analyst might investigate the condition and past progress of endocrinology, and other pertinent fields of medicine, to gain some understanding of the potential for the required theoretical knowledge to emerge over time. In particular, the analyst might look at the nature and extent of any exogenous interference in the relevant sciences. To what extent are government or corporate interests involved in funding research in relevant fields? To what extent are such exogenous interests balanced between competing theoretical perspectives, such that none of the rival theories is likely to gain at the expense of the others merely in virtue of the greater ease with which funding can be found for research on this particular theory? If the funding available in some field of science appears to be under the control of governmental agencies or specific private interests, the analyst has some reason to be skeptical that prevailing conditions are favorable to the emergence of the required theoretical knowledge.
Emma: I think that’s right. Similarly, if the available data appear inadequate in some respect, if, say, they fail to include everyone with or susceptible to, or if they include people who do not have and are not susceptible to, adult-onset diabetes, or if they fail to encompass factors thought to be causally relevant to the disease, or if certain markers for diabetes are systematically neglected or misrepresented in the data, the political analyst must consider the state and development of methods of data collection, and of statistical analysis, with respect to relevant phenomena, and consider the prospect that these methods will spontaneously evolve in the required way.
Connor: Do you really expect political analysts to predict the future development of both theories and empirical methods in multiple scientific disciplines?
Emma: Only in the most rough-and-tumble kind of way. Connie, you keep trying to make the perfect an enemy of the good. I admit that my analytical approach is not perfect, but I insist that it is good, better than existing methods.
Connor: You keep saying that. I’m just road-testing your idea. I’m trying to see what it can do. Trying to keep you honest [smiles].
Emma [laughs]: Fair enough. I appreciate that.
Connor: I know you do.
Emma: Keep in mind where we are at this point in the analysis: the analyst has already determined that policymakers are too ignorant to deliberately realize the relevant objective. That is, the analyst has already discovered reasons to be skeptical that the goal will be realized. The only question remaining at this stage of the analysis is whether any evidence exists to moderate this skepticism. The analyst in this position need not predict in any great detail the future development of relevant sciences. The analyst need only consider whether there is reason to be optimistic that the sciences will evolve in the way required to realize the objective. If there is such evidence, then, depending on the nature and extent of this evidence, the analyst should appropriately moderate their skepticism. If no such evidence exists, then the analyst should not moderate their skepticism about the possibilities for the goal’s realization. It is only in the unlikely event that the analyst somehow knows with a degree of confidence approaching certainty that the relevant sciences will evolve in the required way that their skepticism should be annihilated.
Andre: So, skepticism is the appropriate attitude when policymakers are ignorant of some of the theoretical or empirical knowledge required to deliberately realize some goal. A high bar must be met to overcome this skepticism: the analyst needs reasons to believe that the missing knowledge will emerge spontaneously. As this condition will only be met in exceptional cases, skepticism should be the analyst’s default attitude when policymakers are ignorant of theories or data required to deliberately realize a policy objective. Is that the idea?
Emma: Precisely. At this point in the analysis, the analyst is just looking for reasons to be less skeptical. But, under the circumstances, it is unlikely that their skepticism can – or should – be fully annihilated. The same thing can be said when the analyst determines that policymakers do not possess all of the know-how to bring about the relevant policy goal. As Zippy noted, this is primarily a matter of the inadequacy of the government’s bureaucratic apparatus as a tool for effectively manipulating the relevant causal factors. In the public-health or diabetes example, this might be a matter of the government failing to possess the powers required to adequately coerce or otherwise incentivize the public to conform to whatever behavioral modifications are necessary to mitigate the negative effects of the disease. If eliminating adult-onset diabetes requires every American to suddenly become a gym warrior who abstains from chocolate and Cheetos, pizza and beer, in favor of lean meat and green vegetables, then America will never eliminate diabetes because not every American will voluntarily adopt such a diet and – thankfully – American policymakers lack the capacity to coerce every American to adopt such a diet.
Jack: Even if they had the capacity, that is, even if they were constitutionally permitted to coerce in the required way, it’s not clear what the world would have to look like in order for policymakers to possess the practical ability to coerce in the required way. I mean, in effect, the production of every objectionable foodstuff would have to be outlawed and / or American consumers would have to be physically restrained from consuming such consumables. It would not be enough to constitutionally permit policymakers to coerce. Something like a nutritional holocaust would have to be implemented, with concentration camps for the sugar-addicted. It would be nothing short of barbaric to be effective, if the goal were full elimination of diabetes. More to the point, the political analyst would have to consider the – thankfully unlikely – spontaneous emergence of such circumstances in which policymakers might acquire all of the coercive know-how necessary to realize the goal.
Emma: Very good, Zip. Of course, the relevant goal is unlikely to be full elimination of a disease like Type-2 diabetes rather than its mere mitigation, but the point remains the same. If the political analyst determines that policymakers do not possess all of the know-how required to deliberately mitigate the deleterious health effects of Type-2 diabetes in virtue of the inadequacies of the prevailing state administrative apparatus, the analyst will have to consider the prospects for the spontaneous emergence of the required capacities and abilities, if their skepticism about the prospects for the realization of the relevant goal is to be moderated, if not annihilated.
Jack: Couldn’t it also happen, though, that the spontaneous forces required to compensate for policymaker ignorance in some given case emerge from realms and in ways that have nothing to do with that ignorance? You’ve presented the analyst’s problem in this scenario in terms of the spontaneous forces required for the emergence of the missing knowledge, but this is only one of possibly many ways that spontaneity might compensate for policymaker ignorance. In other words, policymakers might be ignorant in crucial respects and spontaneous forces may be inadequate for the emergence of the missing knowledge, but the relevant goal might be realized regardless, because spontaneous forces in other domains of society – that is, in domains other than the scientific and governmental-administrative realms relevant to the emergence of the missing knowledge – are otherwise adequate to compensate for the consequences of policymaker ignorance.
Emma: Oh, yes! Very good, Jack. I should not have suggested that the only way for spontaneous forces to assist the realization of goals in the presence of ignorance is by providing the missing knowledge to policymakers. There might be many ways, depending on the unique circumstances of a specific case, for spontaneity to facilitate the realization of a policy objective.
Connor: Doesn’t that severely complicate the political analyst’s task?
Emma: It makes it more complicated, yes. How much more complicated, I think, will vary from case to case. In addition to analyzing the prospects for the emergence of the missing knowledge, the analyst will have to consider the likelihood that other circumstances spontaneously emerge to compensate for policymaker ignorance, to correct its goal-defeating consequences.
Connor: What would such consideration look like in practice?
Emma: I think it would involve first trying to determine as far as possible the consequences of policymaker ignorance – in what ways and to what extent some policy will fail in virtue of this ignorance – and then considering possible ways that these failings might be corrected, and, finally, analyzing the prospects for the emergence of such solutions. So, consider again the diabetes example. Suppose we’ve determined that the knowledge that policymakers possess falls short of the knowledge required to deliberately mitigate the deleterious consequences of Type-2 diabetes and, moreover, that the missing knowledge is not very likely to emerge, what are the remaining possibilities for spontaneity to facilitate the realization of the goal?
Jack: Well, much will depend on what policy policymakers ultimately choose, right? I mean, imagine that they do nothing, that they adopt a policy of inaction, then the question will become whether the goal can be realized entirely spontaneously. In the diabetes example, the question will be something like whether the behavioral modifications required to meet the goal of mitigating the nasty consequences of adult diabetes are likely to emerge on their own, without top-down policymaking aimed at deliberately mitigating these consequences: how likely are Americans to spontaneously modify their behavior in the required ways without government direction?
Emma: Yes, right.
Jack: Or instead imagine that, in virtue of their ignorance, rather than adopting a policy of inaction, policymakers adopt the exactly wrong policy, by which I mean the policy that is diametrically opposed to the one they ought to adopt, the policy that would suffice to deliberately realize the goal, if it were chosen, the adequacy of which they are ignorant…
Emma: I think the analyst’s problem is the same here as in the prior case. The question is, how likely are Americans to spontaneously modify their behavior in the ways required? However, unlike the prior case, where spontaneity had to compensate for a lack of advice from the government, here spontaneous forces must overcome the government’s bad, counterproductive, nutritional advice. But, the analyst’s question is the same in both cases: how likely are constituents to spontaneously modify their behavior in the ways required, given the policy choice actually made?
Jack: And, of course, this remains the question if the government’s advice is less wrong than just inadequate or deficient, incomplete, but not incorrect, as far as it goes.
Emma: Yes, that’s right. The hard part will often be figuring out how given policy failings might be corrected. The diabetes case is perhaps deceptively easy in this regard: we know enough about diabetes to know that appropriate behavioral modifications will be required in any case. But, the analyst will probably rarely be so lucky. So, yeah, this makes analysis of the sort I am proposing more complicated, but not impossible. Of course, I would like to reiterate, yet again, that I am suggesting this approach merely as an improvement – a significant improvement, I think – on existing methods. I am not claiming that this approach is perfect or always convenient to use.
Andre: It will help the political analyst, I believe, that there are existing sciences – biology and economics being the two most obvious examples – that primarily investigate spontaneous phenomena.
Emma [smiles]: Andre, my love, unless natural phenomena are the results of the design decisions of the invisible man who is said to live in the sky, every science investigates spontaneous phenomena. Every science studies the causes and consequences of undesigned phenomena. A science of intentional phenomena – a science that investigated why X followed from S’s deliberate performance of X – would serve no purpose.
Andre [laughs]: Ha! Yes, right. You got me. Sorry, a momentary lapse of reason. Anyway, there are various results of sociological, anthropological, and political-scientific research that should also assist the political analyst. Indeed, I would think that the kind of political analysis you’re recommending would eventually lead to scientific inquiry of the sort that will improve such analyses over time.
Emma: That may well be the case. There’s a sense in which what I am suggesting is that we need a science of all of the many sciences that are relevant to effective policymaking, a second-order science that integrates the analyses of first-order sciences that investigate phenomena relevant to the success or failure of political action. The explanatory power of this second-order science of the sciences of policymaking will presumably improve as these first-order sciences progress. That is, the science of political epistemology will advance as we learn more about the relevant spontaneous forces that constitute part of the subject matter of different social and natural sciences.
Jack: Alright! So, are we agreed? Do we accept Emma’s conception of policymakers?
Emma: Not so fast, Zippy. I think I still have some work to do. We agreed at the beginning to seek agreement on a conception of policymakers that would serve to explain both the policy decisions they make and the success, or failure, of these decisions. I have only shown that conceiving of policymakers as ignorant helps to analyze and explain the extent to which their policy decisions succeed, or fail, but I have said nothing about how treating policymakers as ignorant helps to explain their policy decisions. I actually have quite a bit to say about this.
Jack: Of course you do. Lo, far be it for me to lessen your burden, make your task easier, and declare your victory before the battle is won. You’re still on the field, apparently, slaying the wounded. By all means, dazzle us, please.
Emma [smiles]: OK. Well, it seems to me that there’s another problem with basing political analysis on assumptions concerning the motivations of policymakers. I mean, not only are such assumptions incapable of supporting explanations and predictions concerning the success or failure of policy decisions, they also don’t actually explain why policymakers decide as they do.
Connor: What do you mean? Policymakers decide as they do because of how they are, either selfish or altruistic, because of how they are motivated, either in their own interests or in the interests of others, their constituents.
Emma: The claim that policymakers prefer policy P because they are selfish or self-interested, or, conversely, because they are constituent-minded, leaves something important unexplained, something that is, I believe, explicable, at least to some extent.
Connor: And what is that?
Emma: Motivational assumptions fail to explain why people – policymakers, in our case – are either selfish or altruistic, or, more exactly, since people are not typically all selfish or all altruistic all the time, such assumptions fail to explain the extent to which people are selfish or altruistic in given circumstances. Motivational assumptions treat the determinants of choice and action – reasons, motives, motivations, incentives, and purposes – as explanatory primitives, as if these things just pop into a person’s head ex nihilo and are not themselves determined by other considerations.
Jack: So, you’re saying that building political analysis on motivational assumptions is to start from the notion that people, policymakers, are either all bad or all good, or that some people are bad and others good, but it is not to ask – indeed, it is to willfully ignore – why people are bad or good, when and where they are, to the extent that they are. Is that right?
Emma: Right. Human moral character, whatever it is, and however far it varies from person to person, besides being neither directly observable nor indirectly inferable from observation, is surely not entirely innate. It has origins in history, culture, general human psychology, individual psychology, logic, et cetera, that serve to explain it. Perhaps more to the point, the moral character of a particular decision is not well explained by the moral character of the decision-makers. It is rarely, if ever, sufficient to say that a decision is good because the decision-makers are good.
Connor: So, what are you proposing?
Jack: Come on, Connie, what conversation have you been listening to? She’s proposing that epistemic considerations determine motives and that starting political analysis with epistemics serves to explain not only why some policy decision succeeds, or does not, but also why it was taken in the first place.
Emma: And the Wondergenius scores again! You’re really killing it tonight, Zip. What are you on? Smart pills? Meth? Greenies?
Jack: Just coffee in the morning, whiskey in the evening, and pot all day long…
Andre [laughs]: The philosopher’s diet!
Jack: Exactly.
Emma: What I’m saying, Connie, is that the best way to explain the moral character of a decision is in terms of the decision-maker’s knowledge and, more importantly, in terms of their ignorance. Or, perhaps I should be a bit more circumspect: whether it is the best way to account for the moral character of a decision, the decision-maker’s knowledge and ignorance is an important factor in any such account. To state the case in the starkest terms: a person who, in some set of circumstances, is entirely ignorant of morally good options, a person who knows only bad options, is exceedingly unlikely to make a moral choice or to choose a good option, whatever their moral character, whatever the moral quality of their reasons, motives, motivations, purposes, and incentives, unless, of course, spontaneous forces intervene to ensure a good option is selected despite the actor’s ignorance. Conversely, if the only options available to you in some context are morally good ones – how rarely does this happen in real life? – you are unlikely to make a bad decision, even if you are a bad person with bad intentions, again, unless you just get lucky and make a bad decision despite your ignorance.
Connor: I don’t understand. What would it look like to spontaneously make a good decision in ignorance of good options or, conversely, to unintentionally make a bad decision when ignorant of bad options?
Emma: It could happen, for example, if the moral character or the perceived moral character of an option changes over time spontaneously, which is to say, if its moral character changes in a way not foreseen or intended by the decision-maker. If an option that is good or that is thought to be good at one time later comes to be perceived as bad or just as not good, or even as less good, then a person can make a spontaneously bad, not good, or less good decision, despite their ignorance of bad, not good, or less good options. And conversely for the possibility of a spontaneously good decision.
Connor: Is that the only way it could happen?
Emma: Mmmm…well, the role of tacit knowledge in decision making raises a problem here. The question is whether the outcomes of decisions that you make on the basis of your tacit knowledge, the results of the actions that you take on the basis of the things that you know without knowing that you know them, should be counted as deliberately- or spontaneously-realized. I see arguments both ways. Such outcomes result from your knowledge, so they are deliberate in this sense. On the other hand, such outcomes result from knowledge you do not know that you possess, so they may well appear to you as spontaneous; tacit knowledge does not consciously figure in your deliberations, so the results to which it leads may appear to you to not have been purposely caused by you. Perhaps we should describe the contribution that tacit knowledge makes to an outcome as quasi-spontaneous: in fact, a consequence of the actor’s knowledge, but not seen as such from the actor’s perspective. Thus, one might quasi-spontaneously make a good decision, not in ignorance, but due to merely tacit knowledge of good options, and likewise for a bad decision made quasi-spontaneously.
Jack: So, whether a policymaker is altruistic or selfish – or, more carefully, the extent to which a policymaker is constituent-minded rather than selfish or self-interested – depends on their knowledge or, more importantly, on their ignorance of altruistic as opposed to selfish options.
Emma: Correctamundo! But, let’s be a bit careful, I’m not claiming that epistemic considerations fully determine the choice a person makes and, therefore, that they fully determine whether a morally good or bad choice is made. I’m not claiming that epistemics are all that matter. I’m not arguing that other normative considerations such as the perceived moral, prudential, and pecuniary properties of different options are entirely irrelevant to the choice ultimately made, but I am claiming that epistemic considerations are important to decision-making and to explaining a decision. I would go so far as to say that ignorance is the fundamental consideration in decision-making, that knowledge and ignorance of options is logically prior to these other normative considerations.
Jack: So, it’s not that Hume and Rousseau were wrong. They were just too quick.
Emma: Right. Starting with epistemic considerations, rather than leaping to assumptions about the moral character of policymakers, doesn’t undermine the Humean and Rousseauian approaches, it just enriches them. It makes a better understanding of political decision-making possible. Rather than just saying that a particular decision was made because the decision-maker was good or bad, or whatever, we can say that a particular decision was made because of the decision-maker’s epistemic circumstances, which, as we showed earlier, can to some extent be investigated empirically. If we can get a grasp on the options that policymakers confront in virtue of their knowledge and, especially, the options that their ignorance obscures or hides from them, we can say something, at least, about the options they are unlikely to choose. We can at least predict the decisions that they will not make, even though we likely will not be able to specify the decision that they will make without more information about the normative considerations they consider important, which are less open to empirical inquiry, if at all.
Connor: It’s all very obscure when you talk about this in general terms. What is the practical upshot of this point for the diabetes example, say?
Emma: Imagine that our analysis shows that policymakers lack some of the knowledge required to realize the goal of moderating by some percentage deaths due to Type-2 diabetes. We have examined the relevant knowledge that is available and have determined that it is deficient in some essential respects: theoretical consensus is absent in one or more of the pertinent fields of medical science; the available theories are immature, untested, internally incoherent, or just too numerous and mutually contradictory for policymaking purposes; the data are lacking in some important respect; or the government’s bureaucratic apparatus is not up to the task of administering the policy. What conclusion can we draw from this set of circumstances?
Connor: That the goal of moderating deaths from adult-onset diabetes by a particular percentage will not be realized unless spontaneous forces intervene.
Emma: Correct. Imagine that our analysis has also determined that the prospects for spontaneous forces to compensate for the consequences of policymaker ignorance are dim. What further conclusion can we draw?
Jack: That the goal will probably not be realized, full stop.
Emma: Yes. Can we conclude anything from these circumstances about the likelihood that policymakers will choose to pursue the goal of moderating deaths due to Type-2 diabetes?
Jack: Um, I don’t know. Do we know whether policymakers agree with the analyst’s analysis?
Emma: Ah, very good, Zippy. Why should that matter?
Jack: I mean, whether policymakers choose to pursue this goal or some other will depend, at least in part, on how they assess their own epistemic circumstances and the prospects for spontaneous assistance with respect to the various goals. People generally do not choose courses of action that they think themselves too ignorant to pursue effectively, either through deliberate planning or spontaneous facilitation, or a combination of the two. So, much depends on whether policymakers agree with the analyst concerning their unfortunate epistemic position and the weak prospects for spontaneous assistance with respect to the goal of moderating deaths from adult diabetes.
Emma: I set ‘em up and Zippy knocks ‘em down! Very good, Zip. Now, what if, among the options or goals that policymakers confront in the diabetes case is that of engaging in graft or corruption, or – less dramatically – what if they have the option of merely pretending to pursue the goal of moderating deaths due to Type-2 diabetes? What if, rather than earnestly pursuing this goal in their given, unenviable, epistemic circumstances, they have the option of instead engaging in a public-relations campaign to convince their constituents that they’re earnestly trying to moderate the negative effects of diabetes?
Andre: Politicians can often assuage their constituents’ worries by simply making it seem like they are trying, whether or not they are actually trying anything substantive, to address their constituents’ worries. Rather than earnestly pursuing the goal of moderating deaths due to adult diabetes, they might declare “war on diabetes,” form blue-ribbon diabetes panels or diabetes watchdog committees, or hire panels of experts and “put their best people” on the problem, all without doing anything very meaningful to address deaths from diabetes. They might, in other words, engage in obfuscating activities that, from their constituents’ perspectives, are indistinguishable from earnest pursuit of a particular policy goal, and then blame failure to achieve this goal on the recalcitrance of the rival party.
Jack [laughs]: Call it the “LePetomane Principle”…
Connor [perplexed]: The wha?
Jack: “The LePetomane Principle.” Haven’t you ever seen Blazing Saddles? Mel Brooks’ character? The Governor? William J. LePetomane? He says—
Andre: “We’ve got to protect our phony baloney jobs, Gentlemen! We must do something about this immediately!”
Jack [pointing at Emma]: “I didn’t get a ‘harumph!’ out of that guy.”
Andre: “Give the Governor a ‘harumph!’”
Emma [laughing]: Harumph! Ha! Yeah, I think you just described all of politics, ever. Now, here’s the really crucial point: what if, other things being equal, they judge themselves to be more knowledgeable, less ignorant, about playacting at pursuing a goal than they take themselves to be about earnestly pursuing the goal? Which are they likely to choose? Playacting or earnest pursuit?
Connor: It seems clear to me that they are likely to playact, especially if, as you said, they expect the same outcome – failure to mitigate deaths – either way, and their constituents cannot distinguish earnest from pretended pursuit.
Emma: And which is more likely to bear the lower epistemic burden in many contexts, earnest or pretended pursuit?
Connor: I am sad to admit that, in many, perhaps most, political contexts, it’s epistemically easier to pretend to care than it is to actually care.
Emma: Meaning that?
Connor [laughs]: Meaning that my Rousseauian conception of policymakers is impossible to maintain…
Emma: Well, yes, but, not exactly…
Connor: I know, I know. Meaning that whether a policymaker is more Rousseauian than Humean is a function of the nature and extent of their ignorance with respect to Rousseauian, constituent-minded, policy objectives relative to the nature and extent of their ignorance with respect to Humean, more self-interested, policy goals.
Jack: So, are you done, Emma?
Emma: For now, yeah. I’ll keep thinking about it, but I’m tired and, well, more than a little drunk.
Jack: So, are we agreed? Can we call it a night? Connie, you’re the lone holdout. Do we accept Emma’s conception of policymakers?
Connor: Yeah, we’re agreed. Let’s get the check. Post-booze tacos, anyone?
Emma and Jack [together]: Tacos!
Andre [laughs]: I’m in.
Book Nine: For Further Reading
On the Effects of Ignorance on Incentives
Scott Scheall – “Ignorance and the Incentive Structure confronting Policymakers” (2019), Cosmos + Taxis: Studies in Emergent Order and Organization, 7 (1-2), 39-51
Scott Scheall and Parker Crutchfield – “The Priority of the Epistemic” (2021), Episteme, 18 (4), 726-737
Book Nine: Discussion Questions
1. Consider a contemporary policy or policy proposal.
a. What is the ostensible goal of the policy?
b. What theoretical knowledge must policymakers possess in order to deliberately realize the goal?
c. What data do policymakers need, given the theoretical knowledge required, to deliberately realize the goal?
d. What abilities and capacities do policymakers require to deliberately realize the goal, given the required theoretical knowledge and data?
e. What theoretical knowledge do policymakers actually possess, i.e., what theoretical knowledge is publicly available? Is the theoretical knowledge available adequate to requirements? If not, what are the prospects for the spontaneous emergence of the required knowledge? What is the state of theoretical development in the relevant sciences with regard to exogenous interference of corporations and governments?
f. What data do policymakers actually possess, i.e., what data are publicly available? Are the available data adequate to requirements? If not, what are the prospects for the spontaneous emergence of the required data? What is the state of empirical analysis in the relevant sciences with regard to exogenous interference of corporations and governments?
g. What abilities and capacities do policymakers actually possess, i.e., are the government’s policy implementation, enforcement, and administration apparatuses adequate to requirements? If not, what are the prospects for the spontaneous development of these apparatuses?
h. What are the prospects for the spontaneous realization of the goal, given the inadequacy of both existing policymaker knowledge and any spontaneous forces operating to provide policymakers with the missing knowledge required to realize the goal deliberately? In other words, are there any spontaneous forces operating in other domains of society that might compensate for the consequences of policymaker ignorance?
i. What conclusions, if any, can be drawn from this analysis as to whether policymakers will earnestly pursue the policy goal?
2. What does it mean to say that every science investigates spontaneous phenomena? Why would a science of intentional phenomena serve no purpose?
3. Why is skepticism the appropriate response to a determination of the inadequacy of both policymaker knowledge and spontaneous forces to the realization of a policy goal?
4. How do knowledge and ignorance help to explain a person’s incentives and motivations, and, thus, their decisions and actions? What does it mean to say that knowledge and ignorance are logically prior to other normative (e.g., moral, prudential, pecuniary) considerations?
5. How might a person spontaneously make a good decision despite their ignorance of good options? How might a person unintentionally make a bad decision despite their ignorance of bad options?
6. What does it mean to say that starting with considerations of policymakers’ knowledge and ignorance rather than with motivational assumptions enriches Rousseauian and Humean analyses?