Dialogues concerning Natural Politics: Book Seven
How should we conceive of policymakers for the purposes of political analysis?
Book Seven Synopsis: Several weeks have passed since the first part of the dialogue. The discussion proceeds to a positive defense of the conception of policymakers as ignorant. The main question addressed in Book Seven concerns the criteria that a plausible conception of policymakers should satisfy, if it is to function effectively in explanations of both policy decisions and their results. The characters determine that their goal is to discover the simplest conception of policymakers that most plausibly reflects aspects of their intellectual characteristics significant for explaining their decisions and the consequences of their decisions.
Dramatis Personae
Emma – 30 years old; Fifth-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in political philosophy and epistemology; ABD (“all-but-dissertation”); dating Andre
Andre – 35 years old; Fourth-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in philosophy of science; Academic Advisor to undergraduate students in the Philosophy Department; dating Emma
Connor – 24 years old; Second-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in normative ethics; a devout political progressive
Jack – 25 years old; Second-year philosophy PhD student, specializing in logic and epistemology; a devout political libertarian
Book Seven
[Late October 2009. It is a month since the start of the Fall semester. The Administration has just announced its further plans for the re-organization of the University. The graduate students are drinking at a local pub. Andre is recalling the meeting where the changes were announced to University staff, which he attended in his role as Academic Advisor to undergraduate philosophy students.]
Andre: The meeting began with the same self-congratulations with which everything begins with this Administration. Applications to the University are up so-and-so percentage over last year. More grant money is coming in. Enrollment is up. Student retention is up. Everything is up, up, up, except for educational standards, which are, apparently, down, down, way down [laughs].
Connor [laughing]: None of that is surprising. It’s gotta be pretty easy to expand enrollment when the University has given up on enforcing admission criteria.
Andre: Right?! Anyway, the big news is that the Philosophy Department will lose its autonomous status next year.
Connor: What does that mean? They’re instituting a full-on dictatorship?
Jack: They haven’t already?
Andre: It means that departments are going away as an element of the University’s organizational structure.
Emma: To be replaced with?
Andre: To be replaced with “units” [makes quotation marks in the air].
Emma: Isn’t “unit” [makes quotation marks in the air] a slang term for dick?
Andre: Umm, yes. Yes, it is. Each “unit” [makes quotation marks in the air] will be combined with other “units” into another new entity called—
Emma: Wait, let me guess. A “package”? A “bulge”?
Andre [laughs]: No. Depending on their size, they’ll be called “Colleges” [makes quotation marks in the air], “Schools,” or “Centers.”
Emma: Well, “Center” [makes quotation marks in the air] is a little bit phallic, at least. Or maybe it’s vaginal. Definitely pudendal, in any case.
Jack: Especially if you think about inserting your unit into a center or – wait, even better – if you consider conjoining your unit with other units in a center!
Emma [laughs]: Well done, Jack! I knew we were gonna get screwed, but…let me count the ways!!
Connor: So, what will be the fate of the Philosophy Department, pray tell? What erstwhile departments will be our partners in this profane menage?
Andre: Uhhh, they didn’t say.
Emma: They didn’t say?
Andre: Yeah, they’re keeping it a secret. Either they haven’t decided yet or there’s some other reason they want to keep it on the QT. They’ve promised to announce it by the end of the semester.
Jack [exhales]: Wow…well, keep us informed. What a mess!
Andre: Yeah, I will. I know.
Connor: Emma, this reminds me of something I’ve been meaning to bring up with you.
Emma: I didn’t do it! I swear. Whatever it is, Andre made me do it [pointing at Andre].
Andre: Hey! You’re always throwing me under the bus…
Emma: He’s lying! He actually forced me to lay under a bus the other day…
Andre [laughing]: Oh god…
Connor [laughing]: No, it’s nothing bad.
Andre: The bus wasn’t moving. What’s the big deal?
Emma [laughs]: What is it, Connie?
Connor: Remember when we were arguing about politics at Andre’s party a few weeks ago?
Emma: I remember Andre’s party. I remember drinking a lot…and I remember…[makes quotation marks in the air] “Zippy the Wonderdork”!
Jack: Oh my god…
Connor: Yes! That’s the conversation I mean.
Emma: Whatever happened to that? We all agreed to refer to Jack exclusively by his new nickname, but I haven’t heard it since then.
Connor [a bit sheepishly]: Well, it’s easier to refer to him as “Zippy the Wonderdork” when we’re drinking on Andre’s patio than it is, I don’t know, in the seminar room within earshot of faculty members.
Jack: I appreciate your consideration…
Emma: Are you kidding? That’s the best time to use it. You should maximize Zippy’s embarrassment…both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Connor: Alright. I’ll try harder to use it, especially in uniquely embarrassing circumstances.
Jack: Come on, man.
Emma: That’s all I ask. Anyway, what did you want to ask me about Zippy the Wonderdork?
Connor: No, my question’s not about Zippy.
Emma: Oh, damn. I was looking for new opportunities to insult Jackie boy.
Connor: Well, by all means, don’t let me stop you, but—
Jack [sighs]: I’m sitting right here.
Emma: Would you rather I insult you behind your back?
Connor [smiles]: But, I wanted to ask you about something else…
Emma: Shoot!
Connor: If you recall, you were arguing that night that political inquiry should start from neither an assumption that politicians are especially altruistic and concerned with the general welfare of society, nor the assumption that they’re selfish and uniquely concerned with improving their own welfare, but then—
Emma: I did? I don’t remember that. Politicians seem pretty selfish to me.
Jack: Yes, I win! Finally!!
Emma: Wait, that means Zippy wins? We can’t have that. What are my alternatives?
Connor: That’s actually what I wanted to ask: if you reject both of those assumptions, what is left? Where should political analysis begin, if not with one of those assumptions? You argued against me as a defender of the public-interest or “Rousseauian” view, as you called it, and then against Jack—er, Zippy—and the self-interest or “Humean” view, but then you left us hanging, without any idea where you think political analysis should begin, if not with one of those options.
Jack: Yeah, it was a real ruined orgasm, as I recall.
Emma: Gross. I don’t want to think about your orgasms, completed or not.
Connor: You really don’t remember what you were arguing that night?
Emma: Eh, vaguely. It’s coming back to me. I smoke a lot of pot. You shouldn’t expect too much by way of memory from me.
Connor: What we were discussing that night, what I’m asking is, if not as self-interested and if not as public-interested, how should we conceive of politicians for the purposes of explaining and predicting their decisions, and the consequences of those decisions?
Emma: Well, I could say, flippantly, that we should conceive of policymakers as they actually are, as far as possible, that our conception of politicians should be realistic. But, maybe realisticness is too much to ask. Our conception should at least be plausible.
Jack: And the notion that politicians are selfish or at least self-interested is implausible, not realistic enough, for you? You just got done saying that politicians seem selfish!
Emma: I don’t know.
Jack: You don’t know whether you said that?
Emma: No, I mean, I don’t really know whether politicians are selfish or not. The degree to which someone is driven by personal rather than altruistic motives is not empirically discoverable. I can’t evaluate the plausibility of the assumption or, for that matter, of its negation. I can’t look inside a person’s head to discover the nature of their motives, whether selfish or altruistic. If you ask me how it seems that politicians act, I will say, as I just did, that they seem to act more selfishly than altruistically. But, mere appearances, how things seem, are inadequate in the present context. Given the ever-present potential for unintended consequences, I cannot infer the quality of a person’s intentions from the quality of the results of their actions. The road to hell is indeed paved with good intentions, as the road to heaven is occasionally paved with evil or, at least, morally neutral, intentions. What’s more, if memory serves, you noted yourself, Zippy, when arguing against Connor that same night, how dubious it is to think that the truth of these assumptions varies with party membership. There is no reason to think that the Rousseauian assumption is false and the Humean assumption true for one political party, and the Humean assumption false and the Rousseauian assumption true for the other. There’s no reason to think that all the humanitarians congregate in one party and all the knaves in the other.
Jack: The testability stuff would seem to be a problem for Connor’s view, but not for mine. He fetishizes falsifiability. I don’t.
Emma: It’s not necessary to fetishize falsifiability, or to consider it a necessary and sufficient condition for science, to think it better than not for a theory to be grounded on empirical, to-some-degree testable, assumptions…keeping in mind, of course, the standard difficulties with testing any proposition in isolation that we associate with the names Duhem and Quine.
Jack: Fair enough. I would rather build my political theory on testable assumptions, yes.
Emma: I think that may well be possible. We’ll see. But, we may not need testability as such. It will be enough, I think, if our conception of politicians is such that everyone – or most everyone – accepts it or, an even weaker condition, if most everyone agrees that it plausibly reflects aspects of policymakers’ mental characteristics that are relevant to the causes and effects of policy decisions. This requirement is clearly not satisfied in analyses built on the Rousseauian and Humean assumptions, right? There is considerable disagreement – like between the two of you [gesturing at Connor and Jack] – as to whether it is more plausible that political decisions are motivated by policymakers’ concern for themselves or for others, correct?
Connor: Correct.
Emma: Before I get too deep into this, before I rest my neck in the guillotine, by suggesting what I think might be the proper – or, at least, a more promising – starting point for political analysis, we should clarify our terms. We should do a bit of methodology.
Jack: Aren’t we doing methodology already? What is the question, “How should we conceive of politicians for the purposes of political analysis?” if not a methodological question?
Emma: No, true. You’re right, Skippy. We need to do some meta-methodology, some methodology of methodology, if you will.
Jack: Zippy.
Emma: Huh?
Jack: Zippy, not Skippy. You called me “Skippy” just now. I’m Zippy.
Emma [smiling]: I know, I was just testing you. I’m glad to see that you’re embracing it.
Jack: Jesus Chr—
Emma [interrupting]: So! What do we mean by political “inquiry”? What kind of inquiry are we talking about?
Connor: What do you mean? Inquiry into, or analysis of, the causes and effects of political decision-making. What other kind of political inquiry is there?
Emma: Right, but I mean, who’s doing the analyzing? There seem to be at least two kinds of political analysis: formal analysis, such as political scientists, political philosophers, and political theorists do, and informal political analysis, such as the media and constituents do. Which kind of political analysis are we talking about here?
Connor: The formal kind, I would think.
Jack: I don’t see why it should matter, frankly. Shouldn’t we want one conception that is appropriate in both formal and informal contexts? It seems unparsimonious to conceive of policymakers one way in one context and a different way in another context. In keeping with Occam’s Razor, we should want the fewest conceptions suitable for the totality of our purposes – conceptions of policymakers should not be multiplied beyond necessity – and if a single conception will suffice for our purposes in both formal and informal settings, that would seem all to the good.
Emma: Yes. Good, Zippy.
Jack: But, there’s also a certain psychological implausibility to the notion that policymakers should or could be conceived differently in formal and informal contexts. At least in democratic settings, every formal analyst – every political scientist, theorist, or philosopher – is also a potential voter. That distinct conceptions of policymakers might operate in different contexts implies that political scientists, theorists, and philosophers should – or could – switch their mental conceptions of policymakers depending on the prevailing analytical context, which seems psychologically challenging, to say the least.
Emma: Very good, Jack.
Connor: Isn’t it really a question, though, whether the conceptions of politicians employed in formal and informal contexts are conducive to the analytical goals of inquirers in those contexts? If the purposes of constituents are not well served by the conception of policymakers employed in formal analyses, there would seem to be few grounds to insist that constituents adopt the formal conception. And vice versa: If the purposes of formal analysis are not well served by the conception of policymakers that constituents use, there would seem to be little reason to insist that the formalists adopt the layman’s conception of policymakers.
Jack: But, for the reasons I just mentioned – and possibly others – it seems likely that the purposes of formal analysis are closely connected with those of informal analysis. The latter seems to be mainly directed at the realization of constituents’ interests, preferences, goals, et cetera. That is, constituents analyze policymakers in order to determine whether, to what extent, and why or why not, the policy objectives constituents personally value are pursued or not, and, if pursued, why these objectives are either realized or not. To the extent that formal analysts are also constituents, this same concern seems likely to motivate professional political thinkers, as well. At least, there’s no obvious reason why the latter should lose their interest in the worries of constituents when they enter the realm of formal analysis.
Emma: Are we prepared, then, to say that both kinds of political analysis, formal and informal, including analyses offered by the media and pundits, should conceive of policymakers in the same way? We would need some independent reason to think there are benefits to treating policymakers differently for the purposes of formal and informal analysis.
Connor: What about this for an independent reason? Generally speaking, professional political analysts know more about politicians and, thus, are better able to conceive of them more realistically than are amateur analysts. Professional political thinkers are experts about politicians and, thus, their expert conceptions of policymakers should carry more weight than those of non-experts.
Emma: Beg the question much? That’s not an independent reason. Its significance depends on the truth of the contention that professional political analysts are really uniquely knowledgeable about politicians, a contention you’ve asserted, but not argued for. The issue at hand is how we ought to conceive of politicians for the purposes of political analysis. Your answer affirms without evidence or justification that an existing conception – that of professional analysts – is sufficient.
Jack: Plus, even if professional analysts were uniquely knowledgeable about policymakers and even if there were agreement among formal political analysts about the proper way to conceive of policymakers, it might be a reason to convince amateur political analysts – constituents and media pundits – to adopt the professionals’ superior conception, but it wouldn’t license two distinct conceptions, one for the pros and another for laypersons. We would still want one conception of policymakers, not two.
Connor: Why are you including the media in the amateur class rather than the professional class? Some journalists spend their whole careers thinking about politics. Most of the political analyses we hear come from the media, not from academic political scientists or economists.
Emma: God help us! What do you mean when you say that journalists “think about politics”? Do you mean that they think about whatever flatulence happens to be emitted from Washington, London, Moscow, or Brussels in any given week? Yeah, members of the media think about day-to-day political events, but they don’t think deeply about political decision-making, its causes and effects. I assume that part of what distinguishes formal from informal political analysis is the comparative perspicacity and rigor of the first relative to the second, and, moreover, that no one can seriously believe that journalists generally analyze political affairs in an especially rigorous or astute fashion.
Jack: They typically don’t bother to follow up the consequences of political decisions, except perhaps in the most simplistic way. Post hoc ergo propter hoc is the typical inference that journalists make about political causation. They see something happen and attribute it to the nearest politician.
Emma: True enough, Zip. I include the media in the amateur class, Connie, because the vast majority of journalists have nothing more advanced than a bachelor’s degree in journalism and, more to the point, little intellectual ability to think beyond the narrow confines of their education. Journalism, like teaching, is one of those careers that people occasionally fall into because they have no other skills or interests. Those who can, do, those who can’t, sometimes write about people who can.
Jack [laughs]: That’s funny.
Emma: Do you have any idea what students are taught in journalism classes, Connie? They learn about the “Five Ws.” You remember the Five Ws from elementary school – “Who?” “Whaah?” “When?” “Why?” and “Where?” – and they learn about, I don’t know, the Internet, the threat the Internet poses to newspapers, who knows? Do you know what they don’t learn much about? They don’t learn much about history, except, maybe, the history of journalism. They’re not taught the history of politics. They don’t learn military history, intellectual history, or the history of science. Indeed, beyond the most basic introductory science courses that every college student must take, they don’t learn anything about science, except that it’s something that really smart people do. They aren’t required to learn economics. As a glance at the logical fallacies that tend to pass for cogent arguments on a newspaper’s opinion page reveals, they aren’t required to take philosophy courses. They don’t understand the need for trade-offs in a morally complex and ambiguous world. For that matter, they don’t learn how a business operates, how market competition works, what is involved in having to meet expenses while producing for profit, or the duties that come along with employing people. If the public ever stopped to think seriously about how ignorant members of the media tend to be relative to the intellectual requirements of their professional duty to inform the public, they’d stop paying attention to journalists.
Connor: It sounds like you’ve taught some journalism students [smiles]…
Emma [laughs]: Ha! Yes, I have. In order to count as a professional political analyst, to my mind, you have to at least be reasonably knowledgeable about logical arguments, philosophy, the sciences, social and natural, and about world history. I might add that you should be well-read, in general, and capable of writing proper sentences, with subjects and predicates, and everything. Many, I’d say most, journalists fail to meet some of these criteria. But, by all means, any journalists who happen to satisfy these conditions are welcome to join the vaunted category of professional political analysts.
Connor: Fair enough. I’m not going to fight you on a point that you seem strangely passionate about. I mean, you really dislike a lot of people, don’t you? [laughs] Not only that, but you seem to have oddly specific reasons that you have really…uh, considered, put some thought into.
Emma [laughs]: Are you trying to imply that Andre’s a saint?
Andre: For the record, I am a saint, but not necessarily because Emma is demanding. That fact just contributes to my saintliness on the margin.
Emma [laughs]: OK, so what’s next? We know what we’re looking for: the simplest plausible conception of policymakers upon which we can all agree. Or is it the most plausible simple conception? Maybe it doesn’t matter. We are looking for a simple and plausible conception of policymakers that we can all agree reflects aspects of their mental make-up significant for explaining the causes and consequences of the policy decisions they make. Agreed?
Connor: Agreed.
Jack: Yeah, agreed.
Andre [smiling]: I obviously have no choice here. You guys have figured out who wears the pants…
Emma [laughs]: Oh, shut it, you ass.
Andre: See how she treats me?
Book Seven: For Further Reading
On Realism and Anti-Realism in Science
Michael Liston – “Scientific Realism and Antirealism” (Undated), The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/sci-real/
On Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence (i.e., Duhem-Quine Thesis)
Pierre Duhem – The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, P. W. Wiener (trans.) ([1914] 1954), Princeton University Press
W. V. O. Quine – “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd revised edition. ([1951] 1961), Harper and Row.
Larry Laudan – “Demystifying Underdetermination,” in Scientific Theories, C. Wade Savage (ed.) (1990), 267-297, University of Minnesota Press.
On Occam’s Razor and Parsimony
Roger Ariew – Ockham's Razor: A Historical and Philosophical Analysis of Ockham's Principle of Parsimony (1976), University of Illinois Press
Elliot Sober – Ockham’s Razors: A User Manual (2015), Cambridge University Press
Book Seven: Discussion Questions
1. Why might we prefer a realistic – or, at least, a plausible – conception of policymakers? What are some of the potential problems with employing a less realistic, less plausible, conception of policymakers in our analyses of political decision-making?
2. A conception of policymakers might be realistic or plausible in respects not relevant to explaining their policy decisions. Consider some of these alternative plausible conceptions and their explanatory shortcomings. Why might we prefer a conception of policymakers that plausibly reflects their specifically intellectual characteristics?
3. Why does the potential for unintended consequences complicate the possibility of determining the moral quality of a person’s intentions on the basis of the quality of the results of their actions?
4. In what, if any, respects is formal political analysis as defined in Book Seven different from informal political analysis? Do these differences justify using distinct conceptions of policymakers in the two kinds of analysis? Why might a single conception be preferable in both analytical contexts?
5. Are media pundits generally experts about political matters? What sorts of expertise might they possess and what kinds of expertise might they lack?
6. Consider the significance of the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc (“after this, therefore, because of this”) for the manner in which the media reports on and assigns responsibility for many political (and related) events.